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[Abstract]
This paper explores the increased outsourcing of humanitarian and, in particular, 
development services in conﬂict and post-conﬂict settings to private, proﬁt-seeking 
companies that operate according to commercial principles. In integrated post-con-
ﬂict missions, humanitarian aid and reconstruction and development tasks (includ-
ing state building) now take place more or less in parallel. Arguably, governments, 
donors, NGOs and commercial companies are increasingly becoming part of the 
same political project: to assist countries in the transition from war to peace. The 
blurring of the lines between war and post-war settings has expanded the scope of 
activity by commercial actors. On the positive side, commercial companies seem to 
score better on efﬁciency and may contribute to a more professional humanitarian 
and development sector. On the negative side, the ability of governments to moni-
tor and control private contractors is limited, while at the same time, allegations of 
corruption have sometimes been raised. Furthermore, proﬁt-maximising companies 
are not likely to abide by or feel committed to established concepts and principles 
of humanitarian action in the provision of their services to the same extent as more 
traditional actors. If this is the case, the long-term legitimacy of the international 
community’s commitment in war and post-war settings may suffer serious damage.
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Actors: 
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tions and post-war settings
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Empowering commercial actors: 
Outsourcing of humanitarian and 
development services in international 
peace operations and post-war settings 
 
 
By Nina Græger1 
 
1 Introduction 
Since the late 1990s an increasing number of actors have engaged in international 
peace operations, peace building, post-conflict reconstruction and state building.2 The 
range of actors has also become more heterogeneous. This paper explores the emerg-
ence, scope and expansion of private, for-profit companies as providers of humani-
tarian and, especially, development services. The critical focus is on the possible 
effects of these business actors on the long-term legitimacy of the international com-
munity’s engagement in conflict and post-conflict settings.  
 
In the literature and the public debate, considerable attention has been paid to the 
increased demand for security in conflict and post-conflict areas and the resultant 
outsourcing of military and security services to private actors.3 To an increasing 
extent, the United States – with other states gradually following suit4 – is hiring pri-
vate military companies (PMCs) to fulfil security functions formerly performed by 
uniformed personnel in missions abroad. This can be seen as one of the most pro-
found developments in the US way of warfare since the ‘civilisation of the battle-
                                                 
1 Dr. Nina Græger is senior research fellow at NUPI and head of the Department for International 
Politics. The views expressed and errors in this working paper are the author’s own. 
2 Throughout this paper, the terms ‘international peace operations’ and ‘peacekeeping operations’ are 
used interchangeably. State building efforts in post-war states include: the (re-) establishment of a 
democratically accountable military force and police force, and legitimate justice and prison struc-
tures, usually referred to as security sector reform (SSR), as well as efforts directed towards the  
(re-) creation of a system based on the rule of law, democracy (including a political system based 
on pluralism), a (well functioning) welfare system and economic reform. 
3 See e.g. Leander, Anna (2005): ‘The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance 
of Private Military Companies’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33(3: 803–26). 
4 For a study of UK-based PMCs, see Havnelid, Linn F. (2006). Private Military Companies and 
Home State Interests. Conflict or Convergence? A Study of United Kingdom-based Private Military 
Companies. Oslo: University of Oslo, Master thesis.  
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field’.5 By late 2007, there were more civilian contractors involved in security 
services in Iraq than there were members of the US armed forces.6  
 
Civilian actors have always been part of wartime and peacekeeping missions. Within 
the humanitarian sphere, private organisations and especially Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) have dominated the field since the beginning.7 NGOs are 
involved in a range of field activities, including general humanitarian action, preven-
tion, protection, relief, forcible humanitarian actions and restorative humanitarian 
action.8 To this could be added reconstruction as part of state-building processes in 
war-torn societies. 
 
The providers of services in these societies have become a quite diverse group over 
the years. Traditionally, humanitarian actors such as NGOs have provided the bulk of 
humanitarian services in complex emergencies and violent conflicts, and in (natural) 
disaster relief. For-profit actors have usually been engaged in disaster-related recon-
struction processes and more long-term development. By providing logistics, telecom 
services and the like, commercial companies have generally complemented the exper-
tise of NGOs.9  
 
In the integrated post-conflict missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere as well, 
the lines between humanitarian aid on the one hand, and reconstruction and develop-
ment tasks on the other, have become increasingly blurred. Both types of efforts take 
place more or less at the same time, which is one reason why integration and coordi-
nation have become a key challenge for practitioners and politicians involved in 
international peace operations. As this paper will show, the blurring of lines between 
war and post-war settings has also expanded the scope of activity of commercial 
actors, with potentially serious consequences.  
 
This paper analyses one particular trend in this picture – the increased outsourcing of 
services in conflict and, especially, post-conflict settings to private, profit-seeking 
companies that operate according to commercial principles. Two issues are of 
particular interest in this context: the ability of governments to monitor and control 
private contractors; and the relevance of preserving a space for traditional 
humanitarian actors in post-conflict reconstruction and state-building processes. 
 
Regarding the former, we need to ask: to what extent has the current politics of out-
sourcing reduced the potential (and arenas) for control of those who provide services, 
and of the quality and scope of these services, due to the lack of transparency and 
                                                 
5 According to Geoffrey S. Corn, assistant professor of law and former lieutenant colonel in the US 
Army, this is probably the most important change since the use of conscription during the US Civil 
War. Corn, Geoffrey S. (2007) ‘Contractor, the Privatization of War, and Accountability’, World 
Politics Review, 5 October [www.worldpoliticsreviews.com, accessed in December 2007].  
6 Corn (2007). 
7 The biggest international NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and, to varying degrees, in post-war 
settings are Oxfam, Care International, Médécins Sans Frontières and Save the Children.  
 8 This typology is borrowed from West, Katharina (2001) Agents of Altruism: The Expansion of 
Humanitarian NGOs in Rwanda and Afghanistan. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 9 Binder, Andreas and Jan Martin Witte (2007): ‘Business engagement in humanitarian relief: key 
trends and policy implications’, HPG (Humanitarian Policy Group) Background Paper, June, p. 
19. 
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accountability of commercial actors? Have donors and democratic governments in 
practice also outsourced oversight to private companies and their sub-contractors?  
 
With regard to the second issue, the idea that there should be made a ‘humanitarian 
space’ qualitatively different from the military sphere in international conflicts is 
rooted in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977. Arguably, the idea of preserving 
a ‘humanitarian space’ has been overtaken by the policies and practices of contempo-
rary peacekeeping missions and post-conflict settings, such as a comprehensive 
approach. To what extent would such a space still be possible and desirable? Profit-
maximising companies are not likely to abide by or feel committed to the established 
concepts, principles and practices of humanitarian action in the provision of their 
services in the same way as more traditional actors are. If the commitment to humani-
tarian principles (humanity, impartiality and neutrality) or established codes of 
conduct, or both, as well as accountability and transparency is reduced through out-
sourcing, then how would this affect the legitimacy of international engagement in 
(post-) conflict settings?10 
 
In the next section, we take a closer look at the commercial, for-profit humanitarian 
companies themselves. In section three, we analyse the most important implications 
related to the emergence and expansion of commercial actors in today’s post-conflict 
settings, including the questions of principle to which this gives rise. Section four 
discusses some possible explanations of why tasks have been outsourced to 
commercial companies, including the changes in the environment in which the 
humanitarian and development actors are operating. The conclusion sums up the 
argument.11 
 
10 There exist various definitions of what constitutes the ‘international community’. In this paper, the 
term is used to refer to plans and practices undertaken by representatives of the international com-
munity of particular relevance to international peace operations, including international organisa-
tions like the UN (including its numerous agencies), NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the World Bank 
etc., as well as by individual states (and their agencies) and NGOs.  
11 In terms of methodology, the paper is based on publicly available secondary sources (mostly books, 
articles and web pages), supplemented with a few primary sources (email interviews, phone talks). 
While the international academic literature on PMC is growing, the literature on and even general 
information about commercial actors operating in the civilian sphere of post-conflict settings and 
peace operations has remained sparse. I would like to emphasise all the limitations this may place 
on my conclusions and that this paper should be seen as a contribution to the debate, rather than as 
an attempt to assess the overall importance of the for-profit companies.  

 2 Commercial actors – who they are and what 
they offer 
In the overall picture, NGOs and other traditional actors by far outnumber both non-
profit and for-profit commercial actors engaging in humanitarian action. However, as 
a consequence of the blurred lines between the humanitarian and the development 
phase in conflicts and peace operations, the presence of commercial companies is 
becoming increasingly felt in all phases of the conflict, and not just in the develop-
ment phase. In the large international peace operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
outsourcing of tasks to private commercial actors has assumed an unprecedented 
scope. 
 
What characterises these commercial providers of reconstruction and development 
services? What do commercial companies offer that NGOs and other more traditional 
humanitarian actors cannot? Who are buying their services, and how are commercial 
companies and donor governments connected? Commercial companies that engage in 
post-conflict settings today stand out as a basically heterogeneous group of actors, so 
no category or definition can cover the entire spectrum of the commercial companies 
involved.  
 
Private commercial actors can offer a wide range of services from an abundant port-
folio.12 Commercial private companies that operate in post-conflict settings engage in 
foreign aid projects, reconstruction tasks and also act as policy advisors and consul-
tants. A company like the US-based Chemonics International Inc., for instance, takes 
on projects linked to reconstruction and more long-term development, including food 
and water security, sanitation management, the reduction of malnutrition or local 
deceases, the promotion of local tourism, and other activities. Another US-based com-
pany, IAP Worldwide Services, provides various federal agencies, among them 
USAID (the United States Agency for International Development), with operation 
support and special services, including staff to supplement the existing workforce in 
support of family planning, HIV/AIDS care and education, communications etc. in 
Asia, Africa and the Caucasus.13  
 
IAP Worldwide Services has also specialised in responding to the new types of com-
plex emergencies by offering services to the US armed forces; according to their web-
site: ‘We take pride in filling our critical role so that our armed services can concen-
trate on their vital missions – whether it is helping them abroad or supporting them on 
the home front’. IAP Worldwide Services is serving the US Department of Defense in 
Iraq, Kuwait and other countries where US armed forces are deployed, by providing 
                                                 
12 Post-conflict tasks like the promotion of democracy and rule of law, political pluralism and an inde-
pendent media, a politically accountable police and military, national, regional and local govern-
ment, and a sustainable economy are still mainly the responsibility of international organisations in 
cooperation with the recipient government, and these have a different mandate than NGOs and 
commercial actors. See Binder and Witte (2007: 21). 
13 Http://www.iapws.com/clients/fed.aspx. Accessed 5 September 2008. 
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construction, engineering and logistics support, heavy lift and personnel transpor-
tation, power production (and plants).14 The company also provides services for US 
Army locations at home (emergency power generation, material maintenance, 
transport etc.) and at military bases abroad.  
 
Although large public donors (the customers of the commercial companies) like 
USAID and the British Department for International Development (DFID) have lists 
over contracts, it can be difficult to pin-point the activities of the commercial com-
panies. First, because many of them do not operate in the field directly but provide 
government agencies, international organisations and even NGOs in donor and recipe-
ent countries with advice as consultants. Furthermore, the actual delivery services will 
often be sub-contracted to NGOs, either local or international.15  
 
Second, a large share of the funding awarded to commercial companies ends up with 
sub-contracting firms, which makes the contracting companies difficult to track down. 
For example, Chemonics International Inc., in itself a big commercial company, has 
acted as sub-contractor in Iraq to such large international corporations as the Research 
Triangle Institute and BearingPoint in projects on local governance and economic 
governance, respectively.16 Other big contracting agencies engaged in post-conflict 
areas include Bechtel, Halliburton and Kellogg, Brown & Root.17 Both large corpora-
tions and smaller sub-contractors compete for contracts in conflict and post-conflict 
settings around the world. 
 
Compared to other actors in the field – like NGOs, UN agencies and states – private 
companies represent a different type of actor or polity. Despite some variations in the 
views and practices of these companies, at least one characteristic pertains to all of 
them: the drive for profit and (new) markets. Commercial companies operate where 
there is a market for their services and there are fat contracts to be won. Crudely put, 
profit-seeking companies are not in the humanitarian and development game in order 
to achieve or contribute to the common good, but to earn money and, hence, satisfy 
their shareholders and board of directors.  
 
Commercial companies have also been important contributors to disaster-related 
humanitarian relief, referred to as ‘corporate philanthropy’.18 Business companies 
have been particularly active in the provision of logistics, information technology and 
telecommunications services and, to some degree, in immediate aid supplies as well. 
More recently, however, this non-commercial business contribution has taken the 
form of direct engagement, for example through partnerships or meta-initiatives. This 
direct non-profit engagement may not be a reflection of altruism or philanthropy but a 
result of the need for positive branding in view of future contracts. As argued by 
Andrea Binder and Jan Martin Witte, a partnership with a well-reputed and 
experienced international agency or NGO could improve the company’s public 
profile.19 Furthermore, they argue, corporate social responsibility through non-profit 
                                                 
14 Http://www.iapws.com/clients/dod.aspx. Accessed  5 September 2008. 
15 Binder and Witte (2007: 21). 
16 Beelman, Maude (ed.) (2003) ‘Winning Contractors: US Contractors Reap the Windfalls of Post-
war Reconstruction’, Center for Public Integrity, October.  
17 Binder and Witte (2007: 19). 
18 Binder and Witte (2007: 9) 
19 Binder and Witte (2007: 12). 
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engagement may increase staff motivation in companies. Arguably, by supplying 
countries with a certain type of equipment or technology offered for free by one 
particular company, future orders and contracts for that company in the very same 
country could be facilitated, too.  
 
Traditional humanitarian actors such as NGOs emphasise humanitarian principles as 
guiding lines for their engagement in conflict and post-conflict settings (more on this 
below). What, then, are the principles or codes of conduct that provide guidance to 
commercial companies and corporations? Many companies have their own ‘code of 
ethics’ and ethical standards or values. For instance, IAP Worldwide Services states: 
‘honesty and fairness are essential to the way IAP does business and how we interact 
with people’; further, ‘…honesty, dignity, fairness, and respect to our customers, em-
ployees, suppliers, and the community (…)’ is part of IAPs Corporate Ethics.20 How-
ever, these ethical codes and standards generally are directed more towards the cus-
tomers – that is, donors and governments – than towards the people at the receiving 
end of their services. This represents a major difference from NGOs and other tradi-
tional actors, where, as we shall see, humanitarianism is at the core. 
 
Who are those demanding the services of commercial companies? Governments and 
government agencies are the major customers, or buyers, of the services offered by 
commercial companies, as is the case with NGOs and even private military compa-
nies. The financial volume of the ‘humanitarian and development market’ has in-
creased dramatically since 1990. In 2006, more than two-thirds of public funds were 
spent bilaterally on private companies. Given the amount of public spending, it should 
hardly be surprising that there is increased interest, presence and desire to control how 
donor governments spend resources in post-conflict settings.21 
 
Most commercial companies involved in post-war settings are based in the USA and 
the UK. These countries have an established tradition of outsourcing tasks to private 
actors, and are deeply involved in peace operations around the globe. In the United 
States, the Pentagon, the State Department, the US armed forces but especially 
USAID have been outsourcing functions to commercial profit-based companies and 
their sub-contractors. In the UK, the contracts are outsourced through the DFID and 
other government agencies. Like the USA, Britain has been heavily engaged in the 
international operations in Afghanistan, with military and civilian contributions. In 
2006, the UK and Afghanistan signed a 10-year Development Partnership Arrange-
ment. Britain has become the second largest bilateral donor in Afghanistan, after the 
USA. Britain also has spent more than GBP 490 million in the country since 2001, 
and the figures for 2007/2008 are expected to be 107 million pounds.22 In Iraq, DFID 
has invested approximately 78 million pounds in the improvement of infrastructure in 
southern Iraq, especially electricity and water supply.23 
 
The outsourcing policy is not typical of Europe, however, where NGOs are still the 
major recipients of donor funding. Indeed, with the exception of the UK, the practice 
of buying humanitarian services from commercial for-profit companies is hardly 
noticeable in Europe. The dominance of US and British donors in the use of commer-
                                                 
20 Http://www.iapws.com/who/mission.aspx. Accessed 5 September 2008. 
21 Binder and Witte (2007: 5–6). 
22 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/afghanistan.asp.Accessed 22 August 2008. 
23 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/iraq-instrastructure.asp. Accessed 22 August 2008. 
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cial companies as contractors in post-conflict settings could indicate the existence of 
different cultures and bureaucratic traditions, in addition to more flexible funding 
regulations than in the rest of Europe.24  
 
This might also indicate that the United States and United Kingdom have a particular 
stake as lead nations in the ‘war on terror’ initiated in 2001. In consequence, both 
states are using their donor positions to channel humanitarian aid and, especially, 
more long-term reconstruction and development projects into the missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq to promote stability – and success. Commercial corporations 
based in the USA have been awarded large USAID contracts in post-war Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In these two post-conflict settings alone, close to one hundred US 
humanitarian actors were involved at an early stage.25 However, the rise in the num-
ber of commercial contractors is not related to these specific missions only – so this is 
but one possible explanation. 
 
Having looked at some of the main features of commercial companies engaged in 
post-conflict settings and international peace operations and their main donors, we 
now turn to some possible implications of the policy of outsourcing. 
 
24 Direct disbursement of government donor funds to commercial for-profit actors is even prohibited 
in some European countries, according to Binder and Witte’s study (2007: 19–21). 
25 The Center for Public Integrity has published a list naming the biggest commercial contractors in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (see Beelman 2003).  
3 Outsourcing practices – some implications 
Despite the potential gains with regard to effectiveness and professionalism, the out-
sourcing of humanitarian and development tasks to commercial actors also gives rise 
to several principle and practical questions.  
 
3.1 Increased competition for contracts – good or bad?  
To what extent may increased outsourcing tighten the competition for donor funds 
and contracts between traditional humanitarian actors and commercial companies? 
The idea that commercial companies and more traditional actors like NGOs compete 
on a commercial basis is overstated, according to recent research.26 Commercial 
profit-seeking actors generally focus on reconstruction and long-term social and eco-
nomic development like the provision of infrastructure, communication services and 
other logistical service, and are less involved in typical disaster relief and humani-
tarian services.  
 
While immediate relief, such as food and shelter or field hospitals, is still mainly 
offered by NGOs, some commercial companies also have moved into humanitarian 
relief in natural disaster operations as well as in post-conflict operations. These firms 
are not necessarily visible in the field, but they provide advice to government agen-
cies, international actors and NGOs.27 This development may be a result of the in-
creased blurring of the lines between the humanitarian and the development phase, 
noted above. When humanitarian relief and more long-term development projects are 
carried out at more or less the same time, then a blurring of tasks might also follow. 
Reconstruction tasks like building houses and schools, or water and electricity sup-
plies, in post-conflict settings have been conducted by both NGOs and commercial 
companies for some time now. 
 
In general, however, private corporations – whether they engage in the humanitarian 
and development sector for profit or not – tend to avoid contracts in post-conflict set-
tings because of the associated dangers. These dangers may threaten the safety of the 
corporate workers, as well as the standing and reputation of the companies them-
selves, many of which cannot afford to be associated with the conflict or the conflict-
ing parties.28 This should not be confused with the ethics and moral principles, which 
many NGOs would be concerned about. For commercial actors, this is about the com-
pany’s image-making and about ensuring profitable future contracts once the area has 
become safe(r). For example, personnel losses will be associated with the mission as 
such, and will give rise to questions as to whether engagement was a good idea. When 
personnel are brought back in body bags, future business opportunities in the conflict 
are endangered. Who wants to do business with or invest money in a company willing 
to take such risks? Or so the argument goes. 
                                                 
26  Binder and Witte (2007). 
27 According to Binder and Witte (2007: 21), corporations like BearingPoint and Booz Allen 
Hamilton, as well as McKinsey & Company have moved into the humanitarian business. 
28 Binder and Witte (2007: 11). 
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By implication, in dangerous post-conflict settings NGOs might have a competitive 
advantage over commercial companies in bidding for contracts. While few 
humanitarian workers may be willing to die for the good cause of saving other human 
beings, NGOs are at least familiar with the risks related to operations in warlike or 
post-war areas. NGOs also attract people to work for them who want to put into prac-
tice their moral responsibility to engage in a better world. Finally, NGOs do not risk 
going out of business, because they are not driven by the search for profit. 
 
One approach for commercial actors is to engage in partnerships with NGOs. Partner-
ships and cooperation between non-profit (e.g. NGOs) and commercial actors, as well 
as complementary service portfolios, seem to be a growing trend, as noted above.29  
 
Another alternative for commercial businesses, and one that may have an effect on 
competition in the longer run, is to buy security for their employees in the field by hir-
ing private security companies to protect them. Unlike most NGOs who are commit-
ted by the principles of impartiality and neutrality, commercial companies are likely 
to have few principled arguments against PMCs or private security forces in general.  
 
The idea that there should be made a ‘humanitarian space’ qualitatively different from 
the military sphere in international conflicts is rooted in the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and 1977, which established that ‘certain areas should enjoy special protection 
even in the midst of ongoing conflict’. By preserving a space for humanitarian action, 
one would simultaneously preserve a certain degree of impartiality, neutrality or at 
least independence from politicians and governments, on both sides of a conflict – or 
so the argument goes. While the requirement of neutrality and impartiality generally 
speaking has been loosened over time, political independence still is a trademark of 
humanitarian actors involved in conflict and post-conflict settings, and especially of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  
 
Since NGOs are most actively engaged in the early phases of an emergency or relief 
operation, leaving the more long-term development tasks to commercial for-profit 
companies, the outsourcing trend may not involve a higher level of competition for 
humanitarian funds for NGOs.  On the other hand, the international community or the 
lead countries in a peace operation may be eager to initiate the reconstruction phase as 
early as possible, for financial and/or domestic political reasons. One political reason 
could be the wish to signal that there has been progress towards peace and stability 
and that the operation (and proceeding military intervention) is a success.  
 
Furthermore, deployment of military forces and/or the hiring of security services over 
time is costly. A high number of casualties, reduced or stretched budgets, or lack of 
political support for the engagement at home – or a combination of all these factors – 
could push for an early exit. These costs would be particularly important in relation to 
national political elections: for instance, in the 2008 US presidential election 
campaign, withdrawal of US troops from Iraq was an issue for both final candidates.  
 
                                                 
29 These are voluntary and collaborative initiatives between various types of actors involved in 
humanitarian relief, like the one between Motorola and Care International since 2004 (Binder and 
Witte 2007: 10, 19).  
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As a result of practical and political reasons then, the early, relief phase of a mission 
and the post-conflict reconstruction and state building phase may overlap in time. 
This may in turn create a certain degree of overlap between NGO and commercial 
companies’ engagement, making turf battles and competition more likely. The next 
section focuses on how this development may affect the principles of humanitarian 
action: If the role and position of NGOs in conflict and post-conflicts settings are 
challenged, will that entail sacrificing essential humanitarian principles? In the 
context of this paper, one concern is the potential effect this might have on the 
legitimacy of international engagement in (post-) conflict settings per se. 
 
3.2 From altruism to profit? 
One important question raised by the privatisation and commercialisation of humani-
tarian services in international peace operations and post-conflict areas concerns 
ethics. Humanitarianism is circumscribed by certain ethical rules, known as humani-
tarian principles: primarily humanity (or universality), impartiality (or independence) 
and neutrality. Most NGOs and other traditional humanitarian organisations adhere to 
and act according to these principles.30 The core objective of their action and very 
existence is to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain basic human dignity. The 
agenda of protecting people from or under the imminent threat of violence is shared 
by traditional humanitarian actors and military forces. Indeed, in many UN peace-
keeping missions in the late 1990s civilian protection was a major objective of the 
military intervention or justification for it (as in the Kosovo conflict in 1999). In 
2005, the importance of protecting civilians was enshrined in the principle of 
Responsibility to Protect, adopted by the UN Millennium Review Summit Declara-
tion.31 
 
The debate about the ethics of letting commercial interests into the humanitarian 
sphere, broadly defined, has several aspects. An NGO may be an expression of social 
mobilisation and may claim to have a social mission. Some analysts have emphasised 
that the legitimacy of such altruistic missions cannot be ‘lent out’ to profit-seeking 
actors who neglect the importance of impartiality and independency.32 There would 
seem to be a basic and inherent tension between commercial interests based on the 
idea of profit on the one hand, and humanitarianism based on altruistic ideas on the 
other. Central questions in this debate concern whether the practice of buying services 
from profit-maximising companies acts to undermine the idea of humanitarianism 
itself, and whether humanitarian relief and aid based on commercial interests is a con-
tradiction in terms.  
 
                                                 
30 Leader, Nicholas (2000) ‘The Politics of Principle: The principles of humanitarian action in prac-
tice’, HPG (Humanitarian Policy Group) Report 2, March.  
31 World Summit Outcome, paras. 138 and 139, UN, 2005. This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that there is international agreement on what constitutes effective protection by a third party, what 
form military protection should take, the legal justification for the use of force in the protection of 
civilians, the timing regarding the transfer of protection to national or local authorities etc. See 
Wheeler, Victoria and Adele Harmer (2006) ‘Resetting the rules of engagement: trends and issues 
in military–humanitarian relations’, HPG (Humanitarian Policy Group) Research Briefing, No. 21, 
March. 
32 According to Dearing, Tiziana (2004) ‘For aid workers, a deadly blurring of lines’, Boston Globe, 
November 28, 2004. Cited in e-Ariana – Todays Aftghan News, Accessed 30 November 2007 at 
http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf. 
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According to Oliver Richmond, the traditional carriers of humanitarianism, NGOs, 
could be viewed as important mediators between particularistic norms and global gov-
ernance/globalisation.33 Because of their emphasis on impartiality and independency, 
he also poses the question: could NGOs be seen as ‘agents of emancipation against 
domestic, transnational, and international hegemonies, be they liberal or authoritarian, 
national or militaristic?’ 
 
Arguably, NGOs and commercial companies alike could be seen as sub-contractors of 
a liberal peace, because both are hired (by way of donor funding) by the same govern-
ments to do similar jobs. As a result of donor policies where NGOs compete for con-
tracts and, if awarded, form a compact with the donor government, NGOs have 
increasingly become service providers alongside the UN (with its agencies) and busi-
ness actors.34  
 
However, these two types of actors or polities are likely to have different concerns 
and priorities in seeking contracts and when designing the services they offer. Firstly, 
NGOs in the humanitarian field are generally guided by humanitarian needs and 
mandates in the pursuit of their work. Commercial companies, by contrast, have no 
‘humanitarian’ history or mandate that guides or puts restrictions on their activity. As 
one study has noted, private commercial companies seem to pay less attention to 
humanitarian principles. This is not to suggest that commercial actors are not 
concerned with humanitarian issues, but that they are more guided by profit concerns 
and client (donor) needs.35 On the other hand, it could also be argued that the latter 
pertains equally to some of the US NGOs (like Care International) that depend on 
government funding.36  
 
Second, according to the same study, independence from donors (usually govern-
ments) is essential to NGOs, while private commercial actors generally experience 
few compliance problems with donor directives. Commercial companies predomi-
nantly focus on the efficiency and output of their services, in addition to profit, and 
less on issues of politics or principles related to their engagement. Regarding 
impartiality, political issues of principles have at times led to conflicting views 
between NGOs and donors. For commercial companies, business interests will affect 
the type of services they offer and guide the type of contracts they seek.  
 
Third, when missions and tasks are prioritised on the grounds of profit concerns, the 
provision of services may become more targeted. To what extent do commercial 
actors’ agendas and modes of operation correspond to the need in conflict and post-
conflict areas, leading to recovery and not only physical reconstruction? Forced 
transition to the reconstruction phase could obstruct or obscure a continued need for 
humanitarian relief services. Furthermore, commercial interests could lead to non-
impartial or even discriminatory behaviour towards the recipients of aid and 
development. This might mean that groups in post-conflict societies with special 
                                                 
33 Richmond, Oliver (2005) ‘The Dilemmas of Subcontracting the Liberal Peace’, pp. 19–36 in 
Richmond, Oliver & Henry F. Carey (eds) Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peace-
building. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
34 Davis, Austen (2007) ‘Concerning Accountability of Humanitarian Action’, Network Paper, No. 
59, February. Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI, p. 7. 
35 Binder and Witte (2007). 
36 Binder and Witte (2007: 22). Practitioners also have argued that this is the case. 
 16
needs, or groups with atypical needs that require special care or attention, are 
neglected or feel disadvantaged, because reconciling these needs with a streamlined 
portfolio is too costly.  
 
Fourth, when profit concerns prevail, then missions may perhaps also become 
concentrated on high-profile post-conflict operations. It should be noted, however, 
that NGOs also have been criticised for seeking contracts in high-profile complex 
emergencies and post-conflict settings where funding is ample. 
 
Finally, the degree to which private commercial companies take local and cultural 
interests and ideas into account has been questioned by other actors in the field. In the 
early post-war phase in Iraq, the chief executive of a British-based aid agency, Geoff 
Prescott, asked: ‘They will seek to make a profit, but are they really interested in pro-
viding a culturally sensitive and contextually appropriate health system to respond to 
Iraqi’s needs?’37 It may well be that the willingness to consider how to take into 
account various religions, clans (or other local power structures) and history when 
designing services is weaker among actors whose motivations are profit-driven, than 
by actors with a social mandate.38 Compared to the private sector, the NGO environ-
ment has years of experience in developing methods of culturally sensitive 
approaches to areas with cultural complexity, Geoff Prescott and Lara Pellini argue. 
Within the health sector, for instance, one challenge related to public–private 
partnerships concerns divergent philosophies and the absence of a common 
understanding of cross-cultural issues.39 
 
The commercialisation of the development and humanitarian field, leading to a 
weakening of traditional humanitarian principles, also gives rise to concerns beyond 
ethics. To recipients of aid and development, the distinction between the international 
community (the UN or other international organisations), donors and those who 
provide services on their behalf (NGOs or commercial companies) often is blurred. If 
commercial actors give priority to one type of task or project over another, this could 
be interpreted by the parties to a conflict as support to the opponent. Setting priorities 
often takes place at the cost of someone, perhaps the other warring party or parties, 
and can thus have negative effects on the pursuit and implementation of the goals set 
by the international community. For one thing, it could trigger or re-open conflict 
issues driven by ethnic, religious or other power logics.  
 
Secondly, local ownership and credibility in the eyes of local governments is good for 
donor relations in general.  
 
Thirdly, commercial companies often are perceived by the local community as pro-
fiteering from and supporting the intervention or occupation (as in early post-war 
Iraq), which acts to reduce their credibility.40 When the recipients of humanitarian 
                                                 
37 ‘US contractors spark NGO exodus’, Third Sector, 7 January 2004 (http://www.health-
now.org/site/printfriendly.php?articleId=201&menuId=1). Accessed 19 September 2008. 
38 Prescott, Geoff and Lara Pellini (2004) ‘Public–private partnerships in the health sector: the case of 
Iraq’, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 26 (http://www.odihpn.org/search_results.asp), accessed 
19 September 2008. 
39 Prescott and Pellini (2004). 
40 ‘US contractors spark NGO exodus’, Third Sector, 7 January 2004. 
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services see the international presence as non-impartial, its very legitimacy will be 
questioned.  
 
For the profit-seeking companies, a streamlined approach and portfolio with regard to 
the provision of services will ensure the highest degree of efficiency and hence, profit. 
Indeed, one recent study has claimed that the degree to which neutrality and 
impartiality are taken into account by commercial companies seems less important for 
their success than their pre-crisis reputation and in-crisis communication strategies.41  
 
However, all contractors within post-war settings (and not just NGOs) must respect 
certain rules of conduct in order not to jeopardise their reputation and hence the 
chances of winning new contracts from donor governments. It seems that commercial 
or profit-based humanitarian contractors could get the upper hand in the scramble for 
contracts simply by having a record of having provided services efficiently while also 
paying respect to certain minimum ethical standards. In 2006 the World Economic 
Forum launched an initiative aimed at developing universal guidelines on humani-
tarian assistance. One dimension of this ‘Humanitarian Relief Initiative’ was to ‘deve-
lop a set of cross-sector and sector-specific guidelines and standards regarding private 
sector participation in humanitarian relief facilitated by the United Nations’. Such 
guidelines, if agreed upon and introduced, might have an important impact also on 
commercial businesses involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance.42 
Whether this initiative also will spread to the development and reconstruction phase, 
where commercial companies dominate, remains to be seen. 
 
3.3 Politisation of humanitarian action 
The intra-state conflicts that emerged after the end of the Cold War transformed 
humanitarian actors from being an auxiliary to the authorities to major players on the 
international arena. While their growth was welcomed, the resources and power that 
many NGOs now command have brought them onto the political stage, whether wil-
lingly or not. A major challenge for humanitarian actors seems to have been to dis-
tinguish themselves from realpolitik and national political agendas, as well as from 
the politics of agency self-interest.43 
 
NGOs basically claim to be non-political actors, and make reference to the impor-
tance of their humanitarian principles. However, to some extent many NGOs have 
already become political tools, or at least heavily entangled in political visions and 
projects, which may put their independence in doubt. In many countries, NGOs are 
heavily dependant upon the government for funding. By implication, such NGOs will 
also be influenced by government goals, though these need not be in opposition to the 
humanitarian goals, of course. Sometimes NGOs also are made part of the implemen-
tation of a country’s foreign (aid) policy, which means subjecting the principle of 
independence to some degree of invasion by politics. In Norway, for example, the 
government has been encouraging – through close cooperation and funding of con-
crete projects – NGOs to pursue issues that for political or other reasons are proble-
matic for the government. This practice does not pertain to governments of any 
                                                 
41 Binder and Witte (2007: 16). 
42 Cited in Binder and Witte (2007: 16–17). 
43 Dearing (2004: 15). 
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particular political colour but has become a defining feature of Norwegian foreign aid 
policy.44 A case in point is the international campaign for the ban on land mines, in 
which Norwegian NGOs played an important part.45  
 
The building of schools, for instance, a field in which both NGOs and commercial 
companies are engaged, could be interpreted as a political act at the receiving end. In 
a country like Afghanistan, building schools for girls was seen as part of a plan for 
Westernising the country, and many of these schools were burnt down or girls were 
attacked or threatened on their way to school.  
 
How should actors involved in humanitarian assistance relate to politics? The 
sometimes uneasy relationship between humanitarian aid organisations, national 
governments and their military forces in international peace operations or complex 
emergency situations is well known and seems to have intensified.46 Debates about 
the ‘politicisation’ of humanitarian action concern the relationship between 
humanitarian actors and donors (e.g. governments), where the latter has been accused 
of pursuing political goals through NGOs or of manipulating NGOs, potentially 
interfering with their independence.47  
  
The very distinction between the political and the humanitarian ‘articulates discur-
sively the autonomy of the latter over the former’ and shows that such a separation ‘is 
already a power effect’, Paulo Esteves claims.48 However, if the ‘humanitarian space’ 
exists outside the international itself and constitutes humanitarian actors, then the 
removal of this space will simultaneously remove the space reserved for humanitarian 
actors, according to Esteves. However, as pointed out by Fiona Terry, ‘a space “sepa-
rate from the political” […] is seldom possible in practice’.49 Due to the above-noted 
blurring of lines between the conflict and post-conflict phase in international peace 
operations, it has been argued that neutrality has been softened and for all practical 
reasons is now non-existent. 
 
The past years’ heightened debate about impartiality, neutrality and civilian–military 
relations probably reflects the more holistic or comprehensive approach to violent 
conflicts and post-conflict situations that has been pursued by the international com-
munity (e.g. the UN, the EU, NATO) in recent years. As noted by the UN Security 
Council in 2004, peacekeeping only is part of an overall strategy aimed at consolidat-
                                                 
44 As a result of a targeted policy, Norway has five big NGOs within foreign development and aid: the 
Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Peoples Aid, Norwegian Refugee Aid, Save the Children Nor-
way and Norwegian Church Aid. Some would also add the Norwegian branch of CARE Internatio-
nal to the list. 
45 Neumann, Iver B. (2002) “Harnessing Social Power: State Diplomacy and the Land-Mines Issue” 
pp. 106-132 in Andrew F. Cooper, John English & Ramesh Thakur (eds.) Enhancing Global Gov-
ernance: Towards a New Diplomacy? Tokyo: United Nations University Press. For a genereal dis-
cussion, see Neumann, Iver B. og Ole Jacob Sending (2006) “Governance to Governmentality: 
Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power” in International Studies Quarterly 50 (3): 651–672. 
46 Indeed, some countries, among them the USA, have not only crossed the line between these actors 
but also sought to eliminate it (Beelman 2003). 
47 Leader (2000: 50). 
48 Esteves, Paulo (2008) ‘Unfolding the International at Late Modernity: Humanitarian Space and 
Therapeutic Politics’, unpublished paper presented in Oslo, 18 April 2008, p. 22. 
49 Terry, Fiona (2002) Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, p. 19. 
 19
ing and sustaining peace.50 Once the fighting has ceased and a peace agreement has 
been negotiated, it is then that reconstruction and reconciliation processes begin. 
‘Integrated missions’ has been introduced as a concept aimed at improving the coordi-
nation and integration of military and civilian/humanitarian contributions by the inter-
national community and other actors.51 In integrated missions, humanitarian, civilian 
and military actors are de facto made part and parcel of the same overarching political 
project of assisting countries in the transition from war to lasting peace. While there 
seems to be general agreement that integration is necessary, the idea of being tied to 
the political project of a mission has unleashed debates in many NGO environments. 
Critical voices have argued that integrated missions mean subordinating humanitarian 
principles to political or military priorities in the mission, lessening the safety of 
NGOs and reducing humanitarian access.52 
 
In the ‘war on terror’ since 2001 there has been an increasing conflation of humani-
tarian aid, development, military actions and foreign policy. Some governments also 
have been less concerned about the distinction between military and civilian 
contributions to international peace operations. For example, in 2001 US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell publicly referred to NGOs as ‘an important part of our combat 
team’ in Afghanistan. In 2004, the head of USAID said, ‘USAID has stood on the 
front lines of the most important battles in the new war’, referring to the agency’s 
engagement in both Afghanistan and Iraq.53 
 
In some cases, the UN and NGOs act as a single body and as part of a joint strategic 
approach ‘to maximize leverage in negotiations with regimes or warlords’, Austen 
Davis argues.54 This approach has contributed to the blurring of lines between the 
actors involved and to transforming humanitarian action into a more professional 
single humanitarian system, according to Davis. For instance, public–private 
partnerships have been initiated for tackling large, complicated and costly health 
problems in post-conflict and unstable settings within the health sector.55 
 
How does the outsourcing of humanitarian and development services to commercial 
companies impact on this development? The challenge from politics is intensified by 
the rising number of commercial companies in post-conflict settings and international 
peace operations. And, as noted, commercial companies increasingly are entering into 
partnerships with NGOs in their non-profit engagements like disaster relief 
operations. Independence is less relevant to profit-based commercial actors than it is 
to non-profit humanitarian actors guided by altruistic principles and ‘humanitarian-
ism’. Moreover, through contracts with governments, commercial actors sometimes 
are allowed into the strategic level of preparations and negotiations related to 
missions, and may see this as an opportunity to have an impact upon the mission 
                                                 
50 UN document S/PRS/2004/16, 17 May 2004. 
51  For a definition, see p. 3 in Eide, Espen Barth; Anja Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von 
Hippel (2005) Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Oslo: 
NUPI (Independent Study commissioned by the UN ECHA in May). In these missions, all United 
Nations functions report directly through one Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) in order to reduce duplication of efforts, improve the information flow and ensure a more 
strategic approach. See Wheeler and Harmer (2006: 3). 
52 For a discussion, see Wheeler and Harmer (2006:3). 
53 Both citations from Dearing (2004).  
54 Davis, Austen (2007: 7). 
55 See e.g. Prescott and Pellini (2004). 
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itself. And indeed, board members and/or administrative leaders in commercial 
companies often are former government officials.  
 
3.4 Local effects - the labour market 
Actors within the humanitarian realm, they be NGOs or private commercial firms, 
have an impact on the local communities in which they operate. Personnel, or at least 
field officers, hired by commercial companies are recruited on the same ad hoc basis 
and short-term contracts usually offered by NGOs. And even NGOs are sub-contract-
ing more limited tasks to private consultants, using ad hoc contracts. This practice is 
apparently quite common in Afghanistan, for example. As a consequence of ad hoc 
recruitment policies, knowledge networks, local connections and principles of good 
practice may disappear once a contract comes to an end.56  
 
In post-conflict settings, the demand for personnel includes engineers, construction 
workers, translators in interrogations and psychological operations, vehicle drivers 
and the like. The negative effects on the local labour market of high salaries and other 
benefits offered to local workers by NGOs, private military companies or private 
commercial companies are well documented.57  
 
However, the outsourcing of, for instance, reconstruction tasks to international com-
mercial companies also has other local implications. While NGOs have relied largely 
on locals in their work, this has to a lesser extent been the case with commercial 
firms, who have brought in outside consultants with little or no experience from the 
operation area instead of hiring locals.58 In Iraq, the US authorities sought to 
encourage US sub-contractors to hire local labour and business expertise, to help 
reduce local unemployment and prevent the Iraqi labour market from replicating that 
of the Arab Gulf states, where migrant workers dominate.59 Nevertheless, most US 
sub-contractors have imported cheap migrant labour from South Asia in Iraq, causing 
resentment and also violence because of the tight local labour market.60 
 
One argument put forward to justify why reconstruction projects, for instance, are not 
sub-contracted to local companies is that the latter lack the necessary expertise or 
experience. However, even where local companies have both experience and expertise 
in the restoration of infrastructure and services, as is the case with Iraqi construction 
firms and businessmen who became more skilled after the first Gulf War in particular, 
the contracts have gone to international – mostly US – corporations. The fact that 
some of these contracts concern the rebuilding of local and provincial town councils 
                                                 
56 This depends, naturally, on the ability of the organisation to create an institutional memory, by 
institutionalising knowledge and principles into routines and other practices. See Wheeler and 
Harmer (2006). 
57 Such effects could be reduced public services, as when local doctors earn more from working as 
translators than from treating patients; or shifts in the local balance of power, as in Afghanistan. 
Further long-term effects include brain-drain, when educated people leave the country, often for 
good. 
58 The US-based company Chemonics International Inc. in 2003/2004 has been accused of this. See 
The Center for Public Integrity (2003) ‘Chemonics International Inc.’, Windfalls of War. The report 
includes updates from 31 March 2004. 
59 Medani, Khalid Mustafa (2004) ‘State Building in Reverse. The Neo-Liberal “Reconstruction” of 
Iraq’, Middle East Report 232, Fall, pp. 29 ff. 
60 One exception is Bechtel, who has hired local work force and expertise within construction. 
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and schools makes this contracting ‘policy’ even more provocative, according to ana-
lysts.61 Furthermore, participation in reconstruction projects could contribute to local 
ownership to the overarching process (see below). 
There are examples where commercial companies have hired locals. In Afghanistan, 
Chemonics International Inc. hired local people – mostly farmers – for major public-
works projects. There was also a political aim: to reduce local resistance to the 
Afghan government’s upcoming destruction of profitable opium poppy fields by pro-
viding alternative sources of income.62 This hiring policy spurred violent reactions 
from Afghan poppy owners, who had been relying on local labour for the poppy har-
vest. 
 
The hiring of local personnel is essential for individual economies but is also impor-
tant to promote some degree of local ownership of the overall post-war reconstruction 
(and reconciliation) process. Achieving the commitment of the local parties and local 
ownership is recognised as vital to the long-term success of any mission today.63 
Local ownership has become a buzzword in the international discourse also in 
response to allegations that what is taking place is an occupation or a post-modern 
form of imperial rule, rather than a state-building practice.64  
 
By outsourcing services and tasks to private commercial actors, donor governments 
and the international community have for all practical purposes lost control of the 
effect of these companies on the local labour market and local community. That 
means they have also lost control of a major tool in the overarching post-war recon-
struction and reconciliation process, where local ownership is vital. The message from 
Western politicians and governments is that reconstruction will create jobs and benefit 
all Afghans or Iraqis (to take the example of two countries in transition), and in the 
longer run remove the root causes of instability, insecurity or terrorism. However, this 
message risks being overrun by the hiring policies of the various private commercial 
actors to whom these important tasks have been outsourced.  
 
3.5 Corrupt, or simply well connected?  
The private market for humanitarian and development services seems to be expand-
ing, not least because of the increase in the number of commercial contractors and 
sub-contractors. The rise in the outsourcing of contracts to profit-based firms has 
unleashed accusations of unfair competition and even corruption. Now, corruption 
comes in various shades and forms. In the context of this paper, our concern is with 
the absence of competition (or the presence of unfair competition) among actors bid-
ding for contracts in conflict and post-conflict areas. Unfair competition or lack of 
                                                 
61 Medani (2004: 31). 
62 Hafvenstein, Joel (2007) Opium Season. A Year on the Afghan Frontier, Lyons Press. Hafvenstein 
worked for Chemonics International Inc. in Helmand Province between October 2003 and May 
2005. For a book review, see The New York Times, 7 November 2007. 
63 Dreyer, Wincent M. (2006) ‘Retooling the Nationbuilding Strategy in Afghanistan’, Joint Force 
Quarterly, Issue 43, 4th quarter. Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 
Defense University Press. See also United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and 
Guidelines (2008). New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Depart-
ment of Field Support, p. 50. 
64 For a discussion of peace operations and post-conflict settings as modern-style imperial rule see 
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Krogstad.  
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competition is primarily a result of close relations between commercial companies 
and government donors. This practice stands in stark contrast to the principle of free 
market competition, declared as part of the philosophy and neo-liberal values of these 
companies. Because of the dominance of US commercial companies in these opera-
tions, we will focus on some of these and their alleged relations with the US 
government. 
 
Commercial companies usually are dominated by people who, with experience from 
national foreign aid bureaucracies and governments, bring their contacts and networks 
into projects. Former high-ranking government officials are frequently board mem-
bers or hold leading administrative positions in the company, and are central in the 
contracting process, as we shall see. Several cases of the existence of linkages 
between private firms and governments or government agencies have been uncovered, 
and more or less well-founded accusations of such linkages have been put forward. 
Here we are talking about large sums of money in contracts won by private commer-
cial firms without a sufficiently open prior contract process.  
 
Furthermore, there are examples where private US companies with close ties to the 
administration and government agencies have been awarded contracts even though 
contract proposals from competing companies with similar experience and standing 
offered lower costs. In some cases, companies have filed a bid protest to the Govern-
ment Accounting Office, claiming improper contract negotiations.65  
 
Commercial actors – companies or individuals alike – who have won contracts for the 
provision of services in post-war settings also are among the biggest donors to US 
political campaigns. These 70 or so companies that were allocated projects in early 
post-war Iraq and Afghanistan had donated more to the presidential campaigns of 
George W. Bush than to any other politician, according to a report from the Center for 
Public Integrity.66 The top ten contractors on the list had contributed nearly 11 million 
USD to political campaigning (parties, candidates, action committees) between 1990 
and 2003. 
  
According to the same report, nearly 60% of the companies that were awarded con-
tracts in early post-war Iraq and Afghanistan had either employees or board members 
who had served in or had close ties to the executive branch of various presidential 
administrations and Congress members (from both the Democratic and Republican 
parties) or who had served in the highest levels of the US armed forces. Nearly all the 
ten largest contracts were won by commercial companies that employed former high-
ranking government officials, or individuals with close ties to the Pentagon, the State 
Department, USAID or the Congress.  
 
One company that has received extensive media attention in this regard is Kellogg, 
Brown & Root (KBR), a subsidiary of Halliburton. The company was headed by US 
Vice President Dick Cheney before he joined Bush in 2000. Another company that 
has been in the media focus because of its commercial engagement in post-war set-
tings is Chemonics International Inc., which has had large contracts in Afghanistan. 
The company hired specialists who had been permanent or external advisors to or 
                                                 
65 For a discussion of concrete cases, see Center for Public Integrity (2003). 
66 Beelman (2003). 
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officers working for USAID’s various programmes and bureaus in America and 
abroad.67 ‘Soft corruption’ seems a plausible term for parts of this activity.  
 
Close linkage between government donors and private companies or corporations also 
means that instances of irregular activity or negative developments could easily back-
fire on the government. Within the security sector, the scandal where forces from the 
private military company Blackwater killed 17 innocent civilian Iraqis became a 
token of the lack of government control and of the potential consequences of out-
sourcing, as well as of close government–company connections. The media sobriquet 
‘Blackwatergate’ signalled that central politicians were informed and also involved in 
the cover-up operation.68 Scandals involving a commercial company with a large 
contract in post-war reconstruction and/or development projects, and with close 
contacts with government agencies or politicians (e.g. through their board members), 
would also affect the legitimacy of the post-war operation as such in a very negative 
way. 
 
Arguably, (soft) corruption on the receiving end further contributes to the problem of 
incidents or grey-zone areas of corruption on the provider’s side. According to an 
Oxfam report published in January 2008, government capacity in Afghanistan 
generally is weak and corruption is widespread. This obstructs the delivery of services 
and undermines public confidence in post-war state building as a whole. It could also 
encourage ‘short-cuts’ on the part of the commercial actors involved that might not be 
readily uncovered by the media or the general public. 
 
3.6 Transparency and democratic accountability 
The bonds between former employees in government agencies and their present posi-
tion in commercial corporations as administrators or board/trust members also create 
problems related to transparency and accountability around contracts. To what degree 
are commercial companies and actors subjected to democratic control by elected 
politicians and the general public?  
 
While commercial companies’ access to funding agencies, governments and the 
political level is facilitated by informal ties, this usually does not go the other way 
around. Once the negotiation process for a specific contract has been completed, there 
is little or no room for political control of the ensuing agreement by national parlia-
ments, or the general public for that matter. In addition, the bidding process is often a 
closed one. According to Prescott and Pellini, for instance, big USAID contracts were 
awarded to US for-profit companies in a closed-bidding process – even before the war 
had started.69  
 
The General Accounting Office has investigated contracting processes in relation to 
allegations of fraud and cronyism, and has also protested against companies, which 
indicates that the lack of accountability or transparency is a challenge. Moreover, the 
US government has outsourced assessments and evaluations of the commercial con-
                                                 
67 For names and illustrative examples, see Beelman (2003). 
68 See e.g. Jeremy Scahill, ‘Blackwatergate’, The Nation, 4 October 2007. 
69 Prescott and Pellini (2004). 
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tractors to other contractors, further compounding the problem of democratic control 
of business corporations.70  
 
When a policy field suffers from a lack of transparency, one strategy is to follow the 
money. However, financial flows are difficult to track down, due to company policies. 
Commercial actors are generally not interested in having extensive contact with the 
media, unless they themselves invite the media to promote the services they are offer-
ing. This tends to diminish public access to information about their practices and con-
duct.71 The web pages of these companies are usually designed for marketing 
purposes and directed towards governments and other funding agencies. Many com-
mercial companies hesitate to share information about annual revenues and funding 
sources, which also hampers research on the humanitarian and development work 
done by these companies and may create suspicion about their work. 
 
The lack of transparency and openness is not a characteristic of commercial compa-
nies only. Many governments that outsource contracts to commercial companies in 
international peace operations and post-conflict missions have severe restrictions on 
information about the contracts.72 This demonstrates that these contracting processes 
are often closed at both ends. 
 
The ‘spending imperative’, driven by the need for quick success of the intervening 
countries, may also undermine the rigour in the selection of sub-contractors. Much 
funding goes through international NGOs, which then sub-contracted work to local 
organisations that in turn have sometimes sub-contracted again. A 2007 study has 
shown that this long chain of upwards accountability intensifies the difficulties related 
to monitoring, offering ample opportunities for corruption but also for wastage.73 
 
In a longer-term perspective, outsourcing to private actors may also affect the legiti-
macy of humanitarian action, post-war reconstruction, development and state-building 
efforts as such. Accountability and transparency has already become a major chal-
lenge with regard to the use of PMCs. Lack of transparency and accountability may 
backfire and reduce the popular legitimacy and trustworthiness of the international 
community and its institutions and missions as a whole – especially on the receiving 
end but potentially in donor countries as well. Thus there is a real need for systematic 
research on how the principles of transparency and accountability are affected by the 
increased business engagement in the humanitarian sphere.  
 
70 Center for Public Integrity (2003). See also James Risen in The New York Times, ‘Controversial 
Contractor’s Iraq Work Is Split Up’,24 May 2008. 
71 E-mail exchange with a Norwegian journalist working in Afghanistan. 
72 Though this took place five years ago, one example is worth mentioning in this context. In 2003, 
the Center for Public Integrity received only sporadic responses from USAID, the Pentagon and 
State Department to its requests for information (under the 73 Freedom of Information Act law) 
about the funding of on-going missions. The Center then filed suit in the US District Court in 
Washington, DC against the State Department and the Army (Beelman 2003). 
73 Savage, Kevin; Lorenzo Delesgues, Ellen Martin and Gul Pacha Ulfat (2007) ‘Corruption Percep-
tions and Risks in Humanitarian Assistance: an Afghanistan Case Study’, HPG Working Paper, 
July. 

4 Explaining the emergence of commercial 
actors 
Given the range of (possible) negative implications of the outsourcing of both the 
delivery and assessment of humanitarian and development services in post-conflict 
settings, how can this development be explained? The increase in the use of hired 
military contractors from private military companies (PMCs) is usually explained by 
the ‘downsizing’ of military forces (and especially armies) after the end of the Cold 
War, with fewer uniformed personnel available. Even in countries where conscription 
still is practised, active use of the draft to recruit personnel for international peace 
operations is highly problematic for elected politicians.74 Rather than spending bud-
gets on additional forces, especially where forces are stretched thin as in the USA, 
contracts have stood out as the way in which the US Department of Defense could 
‘maximize[ing] the number of “uniforms” for combat functions by minimising the 
number of “uniforms” for support functions’.75 A similar situation is seen in the UK, 
which has come to rely heavily on PMCs for security services. Other states are fol-
lowing suit as well. 
  
By outsourcing functions (often support functions) formerly done by uniformed per-
sonnel to private actors, more resources are available for combat functions and for 
bonuses to retain highly trained personnel and personnel with specific expertise (e.g. 
special operations forces) in the armed forces. According to this explanation, which 
seems plausible enough, the market responded with a mushrooming of private compa-
nies that could offer the requested services on acceptable terms.  
 
While a shortage of military actors may have triggered the outsourcing of security to 
private military companies, other explanations must be sought for the emergence of 
commercial actors within the humanitarian and, especially, development sector. Four 
of these will be mentioned here.  
 
First, there has been a rising demand for the provision of humanitarian and develop-
ment services, due to the increase in complex emergency situations, violent conflicts, 
as well as in post-conflict settings since the end of the Cold War. The growth in the 
financial volume and the number of actors involved reached a peak with the Kosovo 
War in 1999.76 The next peak came with the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, a 
major catalytic event.77 The tsunami catastrophe in particular also led to an increase 
in the number of unprofessional and ad hoc organisations that saw this as a new 
business opportunity. In consequence, coordination problems and overlapping 
services gave the humanitarian sector a somewhat frayed reputation, especially among 
some donors. 
 
                                                 
74 Corn (2007). 
75 Corn (2007). 
76 The number of NGOs present during this conflict is usually estimated to around 500 to 600. 
77 Binder and Witte (2007: 11). 
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Second, the comprehensive, integrated and ‘whole of government’ international 
approach to conflicts and post-conflict challenges that grew out of the lessons learned 
from the second and third generations of peace operations increased the demand for 
better coordination between military and civilian actors. Commercial companies often 
offer professional and streamlined services, and are not hampered by such humani-
tarian principles as impartiality, neutrality and independence. Hence, many of the 
challenges related to military–civilian cooperation and to an integrated approach that 
are experienced by NGOs are not an issue for commercial companies. The combi-
nation of the magnitude of tasks, leading to coordination problems and overlapping of 
services in the NGO community on the one hand, and the inherent tensions between 
the humanitarian principles and an integrated approach on the other, has opened up a 
space for actors with a more practical and pragmatic approach to politics. And here 
commercial companies have found a niche. 
 
Third, traditional humanitarian actors like NGOs vary in size, mandates and practices. 
There is no common standard or modus operandi among these actors; what unites 
them is their humanitarian focus. Against this background, more streamlined commer-
cial companies may stand out as more efficient, professional and solid. These firms 
already possess the business management tools appreciated by many governments and 
private donors. Competition, it is felt, may encourage efficiency and professionalism, 
which is profitable to the receivers of aid and development. Increased professionalism 
could also yield more value for money – also an attractive proposition to the inter-
national community. Commercial companies are more able – indeed, they have 
been forced, due to competition – to specialise in the services they provide. Hence, 
commercial companies could, arguably, bring not only greater professionalism but 
also new technology and funding into the humanitarian and development sphere. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
The outsourcing of humanitarian and, especially, reconstruction and development 
services to commercial companies gives rise to many questions, some of which have 
been addressed in this paper. The practice of humanitarianism has been in a state of 
change for some time now. Humanitarianism is based on ethical concerns that by their 
very nature seek to be non-political. In a world where the demand for humanitarian 
assistance and development services has risen, while the working environments for 
those actors who provide these services have become increasingly politicised, this 
represents a challenge.  
 
As shown in this paper, the blurred lines between the early phase of humanitarian 
assistance and the political realm of the state building and, arguably, reconstruction 
phase in international peace operations add to this challenge. Increasingly, the 
reconstruction process is being initiated earlier than before – often for political 
reasons. Views about whether a country or society has reached the post-conflict stage 
or still is in a state of war – de facto if not de jure – may diverge considerably 
between NGOs, governments, donors, international organisations (e.g. NATO) and 
commercial companies. 
 
Commercial companies have become very important to governments and the 
international community in peace operations and post-conflict settings. Undoubtedly, 
the outsourcing of humanitarian and development services (and sometimes also the 
provision of security services) to commercial actors can have some positive effects. 
Commercial companies seem to score better on efficiency outputs and may contribute 
to a more professional humanitarian and development sector. As a result of commer-
cial involvement, the whole ‘humanitarian market’, broadly defined, has become 
more streamlined, specialised and professionalised. But just who profits from this 
change of practice, economically and politically is a question in need of further 
research. 
 
The consequences of using commercial actors to provide development and humani-
tarian services have some clear ethical aspects. First, handing over these tasks to 
profit-maximising actors may in itself be a contradiction in terms. An expansion in the 
use of commercial companies may jeopardise traditional humanitarian values and 
principles like impartiality, neutrality and independence. By engaging in development 
and reconstruction projects in the early post-conflict phase, companies are also paving 
the way for later commercial contracts. Winning contracts in areas where the conflict 
level is low and the risks fewer may be more important to these companies than 
engaging in areas where their services are actually most needed. Profits may be put 
before the needs on the receiving end and before traditional humanitarian principles.  
 
Second, close links between corporations and government donors and a general lack 
of openness in the contracting process have fuelled suspicions about corruption. 
While in some cases the lines may be blurred between having close relations with old 
friends and outright corruption, there are clear indications that the way in which com-
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mercial humanitarian companies have been established and organised have some 
unfortunate effects. Here, however, it should be added that this may be more of an 
American trend – that is where the biggest corporations are based – than a global one.  
 
One way of overcoming allegations of corruption and lack of control with donor 
funds could be to focus on more transparency and accountability in connection with 
contracts. Another approach could be to direct aid and assistance bilaterally to the 
local (national) governments of the recipient countries, even though corruption exists 
there as well. According to an independent Canadian report, direct, bilateral assistance 
and aid could also strengthen the support of the local people at the receiving end.78 
The fact that the US government has been outsourcing control functions – like the 
assessment and evaluation of contractors – to private companies further compounds 
the problem of control and accountability. 
 
Arguably, the commercialisation trend reveals a more profound change facing the 
international community and governments in international peace operations and in 
assisting countries in their transition from war to peace. Contemporary systems of 
governance and national governments in particular, are not capable of handling the 
challenges of globalisation and of a multi-polar, or non-polar, international system by 
themselves. In consequence, the governance vacuum is filled by actors seeking to 
provide various types of governance in various sectors. Commercial companies 
engaged in post-conflict settings represent but one such type of actor.  
 
The founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum, Klaus Schwab, 
recently argued that global corporations could play an important role in ensuring a 
new system of global governance.79 Corporate global citizenship would be an 
extension of a worldwide corporate engagement which already encompasses more 
than commercial and PR interests today, he claims. The general idea is to go beyond 
social corporate responsibility and towards tackling climate change and other 
challenges in need of a genuinely global response. One step in this direction within 
the realm of post-conflict settings would be to further develop and refine the concept 
of integrated missions by taking into account the current weaknesses. This endeavour 
would necessarily involve expanding the research focus on the coordination of 
civilian and military contributions to include the effect of commercial, for-profit 
actors.  
 
The literature on outsourcing and privatisation within the humanitarian and 
development sphere is limited. Furthermore, information about the activity of 
commercial actors is scarce, and political and scholarly debate largely lacking. 
International (and national) debates generally centre on how humanitarian relief, 
reconstruction tasks and development could best be implemented and coordinated.  
 
Why have outsourcing and commercialisation not been recognised as problematic? 
One reason might be that the need for humanitarianism as well as the existence of a 
market economy is part of the ‘doxa’ – the things and practices that are taken for 
granted and not subjected to serious questioning.80 The idea of ‘saving lives’ – 
                                                 
78 Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, January 2008, Ottawa. 
79 Schwab, Klaus (2008) ‘Off the Couch’, Newsweek, Special Edition, p. 21. 
80  For a discussion of the ‘doxa’, see Pierre Bourdieu (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 164. 
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humanitarianism – is more than one hundred years old. The same goes for market 
economy as a principle for the organisation and implementation of private and public 
services of various kinds. Liberalism and the liberal peace project have also become 
part of that ‘doxa’. Increasingly, we have come to accept liberalism as a way of 
forging not only a political order but also a new social order. In that sense, both NGOs 
and commercial companies have become sub-contractors of a liberal peace promoted 
by the international community and (donor) governments. This paper has argued that 
the control, accountability and transparency dimension of this development must be 
taken more seriously into account.  
 
 
 
